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Abstract
We introduce the notion of cross-risk vulnerability to generalize the concept of risk vulnerability
introduced by Gollier and Pratt (1996). While risk vulnerability captures the idea that the presence of
an unfair financial background risk should make risk-averse individuals behave in a more risk-averse
way with respect to an independent financial risk, cross-risk vulnerability extends this idea to the
impact of a non-financial background risk on the financial risk. It provides an answer to the question
of the impact of a background risk on the optimal coinsurance rate and on the deductible level.
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a bivariate utility function to exhibit cross-risk
vulnerability both toward an actuarially neutral background risk and toward an unfair background
risk. We also analyze the question of the sub-additivity of risk premia and show to what extent
cross-risk vulnerability provides an answer.
Keywords: Risk aversion; Risk vulnerability; Multivariate risk; Background risk.
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1 Introduction
Economic decision making under uncertainty often takes place in the context of multiple risks. Conse-
quently, decisions about endogenous risks must often be taken while simultaneously facing one (or more)
exogenous background risks. Hence, the introduction of multiple sources of uncertainty in the analysis
of the demand for insurance represents significant progress (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1983a,b, 1986;
Kischka, 1987; Eeckhoudt and Kimball, 1992, amongst others). Intuition suggests that, for a risk-averse
individual, the presence of a background risk increases the risk aversion toward other independent risks.
Therefore, concerning the demand for insurance, it should lead to an increase in the optimal coinsurance
rate and to a decrease in the deductible level (Schlesinger, 1981).
However the literature shows that this natural relation between background risk and risk aversion is
not always satisfied. Indeed, Gollier and Pratt (1996) have exhibited examples for which an undesirable
lottery can be made desirable by the introduction of a mean-zero risk. For generalized expected util-
ity preferences, Quiggin (2003) showed that aversion to one risk can be reduced by the presence of an
independent background risk under the assumption of constant risk aversion in the sense of Safra and
Segal (1998) and Quiggin and Chambers (1998). To avoid this counterfactual situation, Gollier and Pratt
(1996) have provided conditions on preferences to guarantee that adding an unfair monetary background
risk makes risk-averse individuals behave in a more risk-averse way. They name this restriction risk vul-
nerability to point out that the willingness to pay to bear risks is vulnerable to the introduction of another
unfair risk. More recently, Franke et al. (2006) have analyzed the case of a multiplicative background
risk and derived necessary and sufficient conditions on preferences to obtain a multiplicative-risk vul-
nerable utility function. In a different framework, Eichner and Wagener (2003) and Eichner (2008) have
transfered the concept of risk-vulnerability into two-parameter mean-variance preferences.
All these results pertain to financial background risks only. The objective of this article is to extend
the concept of risk vulnerability to the multivariate setting of the expected utility theory. It is all the
more important that many economic problems often involve a background risk which is not of the same
nature as the endogenous decision variables. We can, for example, refer to one-period models in which
the background risk is a non-financial risk say, an environmental risk, or a health risk (Bleichrodt et al.,
2003, for recent results). But the exogenous risk can also affect a non-consumable pension-asset, or the
supply of labor, or an economic state variable, or the future consumption (Gollier, 2001; Eeckhoudt et
al., 2005). We introduce the notion of cross-risk vulnerability to capture the idea that the presence of an
unfair non-financial background risk should make risk-averse individuals behave in a more risk-averse
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way with respect to an independent financial risk. The knowledge of the set of cross-risk vulnerable
utility functions is very useful insofar as, under cross-risk vulnerability, the presence of an unfair non
pecuniary background risk increases the demand for insurance. In particular, background risk raises the
optimal coinsurance rate and reduces the optimal level of deductible (for any given coinsurance rate).
The presence of an unfair non pecuniary background risk also reduces the demand for risky assets.
The paper also relates the concept of cross-risk vulnerability to the properties underpinning the as-
sumption of the preference for the disaggregation of harms. In the case of an additive background risk,
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) have shown that the preference for the disaggregation of harms is
a necessary condition for a utility function to be risk vulnerable. In other words, the condition of risk
vulnerability implies the necessity of the alternation of the signs of the first four derivatives of the utility
function and therefore of the preference for the disaggregation of harms. The prudence (positive sign
of the third derivative of the utility function) is thus a necessary condition to obtain risk vulnerability.
We note that the concept of prudence is particularly important in many analyses relative to the insurance
domain. In particular prudence plays an important role for the analysis of self-protection behaviors and
for the evaluation of changes in survival probabilities (Chiu, 2005; Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt, 2006). In
this paper, we show that prudence (more precisely cross-prudence) still plays a decisive role. Besides, we
show that the relation of inclusion between the set of risk vulnerable utility functions and the set of utility
functions that satisfy the preference for the disaggregation of harms does not hold anymore for cross-risk
vulnerability. The class of cross-risk vulnerable bivariate utility functions is thus less restrictive vis-a-vis
the direction of the preferences for the aggregation or the disaggregation of harms.
To emphasize the importance of the notion of cross-risk vulnerability, we provide an application of
our results for an individual who faces two independent risks. We wonder whether the risk premium is
sub-additive. More precisely, we compare the total risk premium, i.e., the amount of money the agent
agrees to pay to get rid of both risks, with the sum of the partial risk premia, i.e., the sum of the amounts
of money the agent agrees to pay to get rid of each individual risk. This question has been previously
investigated in a bivariate setting by Courbage (2001) in the limit of small risks, and by Rey (2003) for
Bernoullian variables. We show here, without any restriction on the distributional properties of both
risks, how cross-risk vulnerability is related to the relative ranking of the total risk premium and the sum
of the partial risk premia.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we define the concept of cross-risk vulnerability.
Then, in section 3, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a bivariate utility function to
enjoy this property. Sections 4 and 5 offers more tractable conditions to obtain the cross-risk vulnerability
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property, and discusses the consistency of the assumptions often made on cross-derivatives of the utility
function. We also show the link between the concept of cross-risk vulnerability and the properties behind
the assumption of the preference for the disaggregation of harms. Section 6 presents our application of
the cross-risk vulnerability to the relative ranking of the total risk premium and the sum of the partial
risk premia. Some final comments are provided in the last section.
2 Definition of cross-risk vulnerability
We consider an individual with a two-argument von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U (assumed
increasing and concave with respect to each argument, and n-times continuously differentiable). We will
assume, for illustrative purposes and for ease of the exposition, that the two arguments refer to the agent’s
wealth and to her health respectively. Thus, we will denote by E [U (x0 + z˜, y0 + ε˜)] the individual’s
expected utility where (x0, y0) represents her initial endowment, z˜ is a random wealth payoff and ε˜ a
risk on the agent’s health. We assume that these two risks are independent.
We address the question of the effect of the unfair background risk ε˜ – namely a risk with a non-
positive expectation, E [ε˜] ≤ 0 – on the willingness to pay to eliminate the independent financial risk z˜.
We first introduce the partial bivariate risk premium for risk z˜ denoted pi1 (Chalfant and Finkelshtain,
1993). This risk premium is the maximum amount the individual agrees to give up in order to substitute
the risk z˜ for its expected value in the presence of the risk ε˜. The risk premium is obtained as the solution
to the following equation
E [U(x0 + z˜, y0 + ε˜)] = E
[
U
(
x0 + E(z˜)− pi
1, y0 + ε˜
)]
. (1)
Obviously, pi1 explicitly depends upon x0, y0, z˜ and ε˜. For reasons of notational convenience, we write
the dependence explicitly only when necessary. We want to compare pi1 with the risk premium for risk z˜
in the absence of the background risk ε˜ which is denoted by pi0 and is solution to the following equation
E [U (x0 + z˜, y0)] = U
(
x0 + E(z˜)− pi
0, y0
)
. (2)
We generalize the notion of derived utility function introduced by Kihlstrom et al. (1981) and Nachman
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(1982) to define the cross-derived utility function1 V as
V (x, y) = E [U (x, y + ε˜)] , ∀x, y, (3)
so that equation (1) becomes
E [V (x0 + z˜, y0)] = V
(
x0 + E(z˜)− pi
1, y0
)
. (4)
Therefore, applying a well-known results due to Pratt (1964), it is equivalent to compare pi1 with pi0 and
to compare the absolute risk aversion toward the financial risk for the derived utility function V with the
absolute risk aversion for the original utility function U .
Let us denote by A(x, y) := −U11(x,y)U1(x,y) the absolute risk aversion toward the financial risk (the
absolute risk aversion on x) for the original utility function U . In order to determine whether pi1 is larger
than pi0 we have to wonder whether the absolute risk aversion for the cross-derived utility function V
AV (x, y) := −
E[U11(x, y + ε˜)]
E[U1(x, y + ε˜)]
(5)
is larger than A(x, y), for all (x, y) and for all unfair risk ε˜. As a consequence, generalizing the notion
of risk vulnerability introduced by Gollier and Pratt (1996) for additive risks and by Franke et al. (2006)
for multiplicative risks, we propose the following definition:
Definition 1. The utility function U is cross-risk vulnerable if (and only if) any unfair non-pecuniary
background risk makes the agent behave in a more risk-averse way:
E [ε˜] ≤ 0 =⇒ AV (x, y) ≥ A(x, y) ∀(x, y). (6)
Definition 1 suggests that any cross-risk vulnerable utility function is cross-DARA – i.e the risk aver-
sion in wealth is decreasing in health, which reads A2(x, y) ≤ 0. Indeed, considering the degenerated
background risk ε˜ = ε ∈ R−, definition 1 yields
AV (x, y) = A(x, y + ε) ≥ A(x, y) ∀(x, y) and ∀ε ≤ 0. (7)
Therefore, the cross-DARA property is necessary for a utility function to be cross-risk vulnerable. Given
1The cross-derived utility function exhibits the same features as the one-dimensional derived utility function, in particular
in terms of monotony and concavity with respect to each argument.
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the cross-DARA property, we can show that definition 1 is equivalent to the cross-risk vulnerability
toward an actuarially neutral background risk, i.e, such that E [ε˜] = 0. More formally, definition 1 can
be equivalently written as follows:
Definition 2. The cross-DARA utility function U – i.e., such that A2 ≤ 0 – is cross-risk vulnerable if
(and only if) any actuarially neutral background risk makes the agent behave in a more risk-averse way:
E [ε˜] = 0 =⇒ AV (x, y) ≥ A(x, y) ∀(x, y). (8)
The necessity is obvious from definition 1, while the sufficiency follows from the fact that any unfair
background risk ε˜ can be expressed as ε¯ + ε˜′ with E [ε˜′] = 0 and E [ε˜] = ε¯, from which we obtain
AV (x, y) = AV
′
(x, y + ε¯), where AV ′ denotes the absolute risk aversion of the derived utility function
V ′ obtained by taking the expectation in (3) with respect to ε˜′ instead of ε˜. Thus, given an actuarially
neutral background risk ε˜′, definition 1 asserts that U is cross-risk vulnerable if AV ′(x, y) ≥ A(x, y),
∀x, y. So, given any ε¯ ≤ 0, AV ′ (x, y + ε¯) ≥ A(x, y), ∀x, y, since A is decreasing in its second
argument. Thus, for any unfair background risk ε˜ = ε¯+ ε˜′, we have AV (x, y) ≥ A(x, y), ∀x, y, which
shows the sufficiency of the cross-risk vulnerability toward an actuarially neutral background risk.
In the remainder of this article, we will restrict our attention to cross-DARA utility functions. From
a theoretical point of view, this assumption is not actually limiting. Indeed, as detailed latter on, the
cross-DARA assumption just implies that the agent in cross-prudent in the second attribute, U112 ≥ 0,
provided the common assumption of correlation aversion, U12 ≤ 0, holds (Epstein and Tanny, 1980;
Richard, 1975). Besides, it does not place any restriction on the preference for the disaggregation of
harms (Eeckhoudt et al., 2007). In addition, in the practical context of health economics for instance,
even thought no empirical evidence exists on the relationship between patient’s perception of health
risks and their wealth, healthier people seem to be less adverse toward financial risks (see Bleichrodt et
al. (2003) for a similar assumption).
3 Characterization of cross-risk vulnerable utility functions
The proposition bellow states the technical condition which fully characterizes the set of utility functions
that satisfy the condition of cross-risk vulnerability:
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Proposition 1. A cross-DARA utility function U is cross-risk vulnerable if and only if:
ξ
(
x, y, y′
)
= U1(x, y
′)
[
A
(
x, y′
)
−A (x, y)
]
− U1(x, y)A2(x, y)
(
y′ − y
)
≥ 0, ∀x, y, y′. (9)
The proof is given in appendix A. It reveals that, if the relation E [ε˜] ≤ 0 =⇒ AV (x, y) ≥
A(x, y),∀(x, y) is equivalent to ξ(x, y, y′) ≥ 0, the relation E [ε˜] ≤ 0 =⇒ AV (x, y) ≤ A(x, y), ∀(x, y)
is equivalent to ξ(x, y, y′) ≤ 0. This remark stresses that when the constraint (9) does not hold, the
introduction of an unfair background risk can actually lower the risk aversion.
Let us stress that proposition 1 allows one to retrieve the results given by Gollier and Pratt (1996)
for additive risk vulnerability and by Franke et al. (2006) for multiplicative risk vulnerability. Indeed,
considering the utility U(x, y) = u(x + y), which accounts for additive risks, proposition 1 shows that
u is risk vulnerable toward an additive background risk if (and only if)
ξ(x, y, y′) = u′(x+ y′)
[
r(x+ y′)− r(x+ y)
]
− (y′ − y)u′(x+ y)r′(x+ y) ≥ 0, (10)
where r = −u′′/u′ denotes the absolute risk aversion of u. Thus, if we replace x + y by w and x + y′
by x, the previous relation yields
Corollary 1 (Gollier and Pratt (1996), Proposition 2). Utility function u is additively risk vulnerable if
and only if u′(x) [r(x)− r(w)]− (x− w)u′(w)r′(w) ≥ 0, for all x,w.
Similarly, we can consider the utility function U(x, y) = u(x·y) with x, y ≥ 0 to take into account to
case of multiplicative background risks. In such a situation, proposition 1 shows that u is risk vulnerable
toward a multiplicative background risk if and only if
ξ(x, y, y′) = y′u′(xy′)
[
R(xy′)−R(xy)
]
− xyu′(xy)R′(xy)(y′ − y) ≥ 0, (11)
where R(x) = x · r(x) is the relative risk aversion of u. The change of variables x → zy and y
′,→ yt
leads to
y ·
(
tu′(zt) [R(zt)−R(z)]− zu′(z)R′(z)(t− 1)
)
≥ 0, (12)
and since y is positive, we finally get:
Corollary 2 (Franke et al. (2006), Main Theorem). Utility function u is multiplicatively risk vulnerable
if and only if u′(zt) [R(zt)−R(z)]− zu′(z)R′(z)(t− 1) ≥ 0, for all t, z ≥ 0.
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As condition (9) is a priori neither very easy to interpret nor very easy to handle, we will provide in
the following sections first necessary conditions and then sufficient conditions whose economic implica-
tions are more straightforward.
4 Necessary conditions for cross-risk vulnerability
Let us remark that ξ(x, y, y) = 0 and ∂ξ∂y′
∣∣∣
y′=y
= 0 for all (x, y), so that a necessary condition for (9) to
hold is
∂2ξ
∂y′2
∣∣∣∣
y′=y
= U1(x, y)A22(x, y) + 2U12(x, y)A2(x, y) ≥ 0. (13)
After expansion, this relation turn out to be equivalent to
U1122
U11
≥
U122
U1
. (14)
This necessary global condition is in fact a local necessary and sufficient condition2 whose intuitive
means is obvious in the case of an individual who is both risk-averse toward financial risks (U11 < 0)
and cross-prudent in wealth3 (U122 ≥ 0). In such a case, relation (14) becomes
−
U1122
U122
≥ −
U11
U1
. (15)
Thus, an individual who is risk-averse and cross-prudent in wealth, is cross-risk vulnerable toward an
actuarially neutral background risk (in the limit of small risk), if and only if her absolute risk aversion
toward a financial risk is smaller than the absolute risk aversion of the function U22, seen as a utility
function per se. Alternatively, for an imprudent individual (U122 ≤ 0), cross-risk vulnerability toward
2Restricting our attention to cross-DARA utility functions and considering the impact of an actuarially neutral background
risk ε˜ on the risk aversion with respect to the agent’s wealth in the limit of small (non-financial) risks, the relative change in
risk aversion reads
∆A
A
∣∣∣∣
(x,y)
:=
AV (x, y)−A(x, y)
A(x, y)
≃
[
U1122
U11
−
U122
U1
]
·
σ2ε˜
2
,
where σ2ε˜ is the variance of ε˜, since up to the second order,
A
V (x, y) ≃ A(x, y) ·
(
1 +
[
U1122
U11
−
U122
U1
]
·
σ2ε˜
2
)
.
Thus, the utility function U is cross-risk vulnerable toward an actuarially neutral background risk (in the limit of small risks),
if and only if
U1122
U11
≥
U122
U1
.
3Following the denomination introduced by Bleichrodt et al. (2003) and Eeckhoudt et al. (2007), we say that an individual
is cross-prudent in wealth if U122 ≥ 0.
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an actuarially neutral background risk is equivalent to the fact that the agent’s absolute risk aversion is
larger than the absolute risk aversion of the function U22, seen as a utility function per se.
We would like to stress that on the contrary to the case of an additive risk considered by Gollier
and Pratt (1996), the class of cross-risk vulnerable utility functions is not merely a subset of the class
of utility functions that comply with the preference for the disaggregation of harms (Eeckhoudt et al.,
2007). Recall that for the one-argument utility function u(x), the preference for the disaggregation of
harms implies the alternation of the signs of the four first derivative of the utility function (Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger, 2006). Then, for an additive background risk, the risk-vulnerability vis-a-vis small risks
reads
−
u′′′
u′′
≥ −
u′′
u′
≥ 0 and − u
′′′′
u′′′
≥ −
u′′
u′
≥ 0, (16)
which implies the alternation of the signs the four first derivative of u(x).
In the case of a two-argument utility function U(x, y), the preference for the disaggregation of harms
requires that U12 ≤ 0, U112 ≥ 0, U122 ≥ 0 and U1122 ≤ 0 (Eeckhoudt et al., 2007). But, the cross-
DARA condition together with (14) are not enough to satisfy these requirements. Unless U12 ≤ 0, i.e
U is correlation-averse4, the cross-DARA condition is not enough to assert that U112 must be positive.
Moreover, condition (14) does not imply that U1122 must be negative unless we assume U122 ≤ 0. As
a consequence, given U(x, y) is cross-risk vulnerable, the alternation of the signs of the first four order
cross-derivatives of the utility function requires the minimal assumption that U is correlation-averse and
that U122 and U112 have the same sign. Consequently, cross-risk vulnerability is less restrictive vis-a-vis
the direction of the preferences for the aggregation of the disaggregation of harms.
5 Sufficient conditions for cross-risk vulnerability
According to equation (14), a local sufficient condition for cross-risk vulnerability toward actuarially
neutral small background risks is U122 ≤ 0 and U1122 ≤ 0, provided that the usual conditions U1 > 0
and U11 < 0 hold. It means that, even if imprudent in wealth (U112 ≤ 0), an individual can still be
cross-risk vulnerable as long as she remains cross-temperate5. As stated by the proposition below, this
locally sufficient condition is also globally sufficient:
4See Epstein and Tanny (1980) and Richard (1975). Remark that the sign of U12 can be easily interpreted in relation with
the sensitivity of the marginal utility of wealth with respect to health which depends on the severity of the illness (Evans and
Viscusi, 1991; Sloan et al., 1998, e.g.).
5Again, following the denomination introduced by Bleichrodt et al. (2003) and Eeckhoudt et al. (2007), we say that an
individual is cross-temperate if U1122 ≤ 0.
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Proposition 2. The cross-DARA utility function U(x, y) is cross-risk vulnerable if U22(x, y) is decreas-
ing and concave in x, i.e. if U122 ≤ 0 and U1122 ≤ 0.
Proof. By Jensen’s inequality
−
E [U11 (x, y + ε˜)]
E [U1 (x, y + ε˜)]
≥ −
U11 (x, y + E [ε˜])
U1 (x, y + E [ε˜])
if U1 and U11 are concave functions of y, namely if U122 ≤ 0 and U1122 ≤ 0. Now, since U is cross-
DARA, A(x, y) is decreasing in y, so that
−
U11 (x, y + E [ε˜])
U1 (x, y + E [ε˜])
≥ −
U11 (x, y)
U1 (x, y)
, ∀ E [ε˜] ≤ 0. 
We observe that the condition in proposition 2 cannot be met if the agent is correlation averse (U12 ≤ 0)
and if U is only defined for y ≥ 0. Indeed, as shown by Menegatti (2001), given a positive function f(t)
defined for t ≥ 0 with f ′(t) < 0, if f ′′ keeps a constant sign, it must be positive. So, applying this result
to the positive function fx(t) 7→ U1(x, t), if U12(x, t) = f ′x(t) < 0 we could not have U122 ≤ 0 since it
would means that f ′′x (t) ≤ 0 which contradicts Menegatti’s result.
Another sufficient condition of the cross-risk vulnerability is the following.
Proposition 3. The cross-DARA utility function U(x, y) is cross-risk vulnerable if U12 ≤ 0 and A22 ≥ 0,
for all x and y.
Proof. Since U is cross-DARA, we have A2 ≤ 0 so that, together with the correlation aversion, i.e.
U12 ≤ 0 we get U12 · A2 ≥ 0, from which we conclude that the random variables U1 (x, y + ε˜) and
A (x, y + ε˜) are co-monotonic and therefore are positively correlated (Hotelling, 1936):
E [A (x, y + ε˜) · U1 (x, y + ε˜)] ≥ E [A (x, y + ε˜)] · E [U1 (x, y + ε˜)] .
Then, the convexity of A in its second argument and Jensen’s inequality allows us to conclude that
E [A (x, y + ε˜) · U1 (x, y + ε˜)] ≥ A (x, y + E [ε˜]) · E [U1 (x, y + ε˜)] (17)
≥ A (x, y) · E [U1 (x, y + ε˜)] , (18)
since E [ε˜] ≤ 0. Now, since A (x, y) · U1 (x, y) = −U11 (x, y), we obtain the expected result. 
Proposition 3 means that the correlation aversion together with the convexity of the absolute risk
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aversion (with respect to its second argument) are sufficient for the cross-risk vulnerability to hold. The
later requirement is rather natural in so far as it means that the reduction of the risk premium pi1 due to
an increase in health is a decreasing function of health.
We have to stress that the sufficient conditions of proposition 3 are very close to the necessity. Indeed,
recall that from the necessary condition (13), we have
A22 + 2
U12 ·A2
U1
≥ 0 (19)
for any cross-risk vulnerable utility function. Thus, for a utility function such that either U12 or A2 is
vanishingly small, we need A22 ≥ 0. Conversely, if A22 is vanishingly small, the product U12 ·A2 must
non-negative and since U must be cross-DARA (A2 ≤ 0), we need U12 ≤ 0.
As a consequence of proposition 3, we can provide an example of family of utility functions that
enjoy the property of cross-risk vulnerability.
Corollary 3. Any function
U(x, y) = − exp [f(x) · g(x)] , (20)
where f and g are any positive, decreasing and convex functions, defines a cross-risk vulnerable utility
function.
The proof is straightforward and left to the reader. As a first example, one can consider f(x) =(
x
x0
)
−α
and g(y) =
(
y
y0
)
−β
with α and β positive. Corollary 3 shows that the utility function
U(x, y) = − exp
[
xα0 · y
β
0
xα · yβ
]
, ∀(x, y) ∈ R+ × R+, (21)
is cross-risk vulnerable. Another example can be provided by the case f(x) = exp
[
− xx0
]
and g(y) =
exp
[
− yy0
]
, with x0 and y0 positive, which yields
U(x, y) = − exp
[
exp
[
−
(
x
x0
+
y
y0
)]]
, ∀(x, y) ∈ R× R. (22)
6 Application
We consider an individual who faces two independent risks. The first one is the financial risk z˜, while
the second one is the non-financial risk ε˜ (a health risk, for example). The total risk premium pi, solution
11
to
E [U (x0 + z˜, y0 + ε˜)] = U (x0 + E [z˜]− pi, y0 + E [ε˜]) , (23)
is the maximum amount of money the individual is ready to give up in order to replace the two risks by
their expected value. Denoting by pi1 the partial risk premium vis-a-vis the financial risk z˜ only (see eq.
(1)) and by pi2 the partial risk premium vis-a-vis the non-financial risk only, we want to compare the total
risk premium pi with the sum of the partial risk premia pi1 + pi2. More precisely we wonder whether
the total risk premium is sub-additive6. As stated by the proposition below, the concept of cross-risk
vulnerability is quite useful to compare the cost of the total risk with the sum of costs of each individual
risk.
For simplicity of the exposition and to get rid of the problems of level effects, we assume that both z˜
and ε˜ are actuarially neutral risks, i.e. E [z˜] = E [ε˜] = 0. We can then state that
Proposition 4. 1. Given U(x, y) is DARA with respect to x, the cross-risk vulnerability is a necessary
condition for pi ≤ pi1 + pi2,
2. Given U(x, y) is IARA with respect to x, the cross-risk vulnerability is a sufficient condition for
pi ≤ pi1 + pi2,
3. Given U(x, y) is CARA with respect to x, the cross-risk vulnerability is a necessary and sufficient
condition for pi ≤ pi1 + pi2.
To prove this result, let us first consider pi1/2 the conditional risk premium for removing the financial
risk z˜ after the agent has already paid to get rid of the non-pecuniary risk ε˜. It is such that:
E
[
U
(
x0 + z˜ − pi
2, y0
)]
= U
(
x0 − pi
2 − pi1/2, y0
)
. (24)
Equations (23) and (24) imply pi = pi1/2 + pi2, so that pi ≤ pi1 + pi2 if and only if pi1/2 ≤ pi1. Then, if
we make explicit the dependence of the pi1 and pi1/2 with respect to the initial endowment, we have
pi1 = piV0 (x0, y0) and pi1/2 = piU0
(
x0 − pi
2(x0, y0), y0
)
, (25)
where piV0 (x0, y0) is such that E [V (x0 + z˜, y0)] = V
(
x0 − pi
V
0 (x0, y0), y0
)
, with V the derived utility
function (3), and piU0 (x0, y0) is such that E [U (x0 + z˜, y0)] = U
(
x0 − pi
U
0 (x0, y0), y0
)
.
6A closely related question is examined by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2001) for financial risks.
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So, the condition pi ≤ pi1 + pi2 is equivalent to piU0
(
x0 − pi
2(x0, y0)
)
≤ piV0 (x0, y0). Then, given U
is CARA in x, piU0
(
x0 − pi
2(x0, y0)
)
= piU0 (x0) which leads to
pi ≤ pi1 + pi2 ⇐⇒ piU0 (x0, y0) ≤ pi
V
0 (x0, y0) , ∀x0, y0, (26)
which proves the third point of proposition 4.
Now, given U is IARA in x, piU0
(
x0 − pi
2(x0, y0)
)
≤ piU0 (x0, y0) since pi2(x0, y0) ≥ 0 provided that
U22 ≤ 0. Then, by cross-risk vulnerability, piU0 (x0, y0) ≤ piV0 (x0, y0), so that piU0
(
x0 − pi
2(x0, y0)
)
≤
piV0 (x0, y0) which proves the second point of proposition 4.
Finally, given U is DARA in x, piU0
(
x0 − pi
2(x0, y0)
)
≥ piU0 (x0, y0) (still provided that U22 ≤ 0).
Then, if piU0
(
x0 − pi
2(x0, y0)
)
≤ piV0 (x0, y0), we necessarily have piU0 (x0, y0) ≤ piV0 (x0, y0) which
proves the first point of proposition 4.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on the impact of an unfair non financial background risk on the risk-
aversion toward another independent financial risk. More precisely, we have defined the notion of cross-
risk vulnerability which extends to the case where the background risk is a non financial risk the concept
of risk vulnerability introduced by Gollier and Pratt (1996) for additive risks and by Franke et al. (2006)
for multiplicative risks. We have then characterized the class of bivariate von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions that exhibits the above property. In particular, we have shown that the presence of
an independent background risk increases the risk aversion towards other independent financial risk,
resulting, for example, in an increased demand for insurance.
This work provides several avenues for future researches. First of all, following Franke et al. (2005)
we can notice that agents usually have to bear some background risk, but that the level of this risk may
change. It would then be worth wondering how an increase in this background risk makes the agent more
risk averse. This question, already addressed by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) and Kimball (1993) for additive
background risks, remains open for multi-attributed utility functions.
Second, we would stress that the property of cross-risk vulnerability turns out to be very useful to
provide answers to comparative statics exercises for the demand of insurance. This problem will be
exposed elsewhere. Besides, in the case of one-dimensional utility functions, risk vulnerability is related
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to the concept of proper risk aversion introduced by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), and to the concept of
standard risk aversion introduced by Kimball (1993): standardness implies properness and properness
implies risk vulnerability. It will be interesting to see how the concepts of proper risk aversion and
standard risk aversion can be extended to the case of non financial background risk, and to analyze if
they are related to the cross-risk vulnerability.
A Proof of proposition 1.
Before we prove proposition 1, let us state the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For any function F such that F (0) = 0 and F ′(0) exists, the following statements are
equivalent
(i) For all ε˜ such that E [ε˜] = 0,E [F (ε˜)] ≥ 0.
(ii) F (ε) ≥ F ′(0) · ε, ∀ε.
Proof.
• (i) =⇒ (ii): Statement (i) holds for any random variable such that E [ε˜] = 0. In particular, it holds
for any ε˜ such that
ε˜ =


ε1 > 0, with probability p,
ε2 < 0, with probability 1− p,
(27)
where p satisfies p · ε1 + (1− p) · ε2 = 0. So, by (i), we have p ·F (ε1) + (1− p) ·F (ε2) ≥ 0, or
equivalently, dividing by p · ε1 = −(1− p) · ε2 > 0:
1
ε1
F (ε1) ≥
1
ε2
· F (ε2) , ∀ε1 > 0 and ε2 < 0. (28)
Therefore, letting ε2 → 0, we have
∀ε1 > 0,
1
ε1
F (ε1) ≥ F
′(0), (29)
and letting ε1 → 0, it yields
∀ε2 < 0,
1
ε2
F (ε2) ≤ F
′(0). (30)
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Since F (0) is obviously larger than or equal to 0, we obtain:
∀ε, F (ε) ≥ F ′(0) · ε. (31)
• (ii) =⇒ (i): If ∀ε, F (ε) ≥ F ′(0) · ε, then whatever the distribution of ε˜, we have
E [F (ε˜)] ≥ F ′(0) · E [ε˜] , (32)
so that
E [ε˜] = 0 =⇒ E [F (ε˜)] ≥ 0. (33)

Now starting from definition 2, we just have to focus on actuarially neutral background risks. Then,
first of all, we notice that expanding condition (9) we get
−A(x, y)
[
U1(x, y
′)− U12(x, y) ·
(
y′ − y
)]
≥
[
U11(x, y
′)− U112(x, y) ·
(
y′ − y
)]
, ∀x, y, y′, (34)
which is equivalent to
f(x, y, ε) ≥ ∂εf(x, y, ε)|ε=0 · ε, ∀x, y and ε, (35)
where
f(x, y, ε) = U11(x, y) · U1(x, y + ε)− U11(x, y + ε) · U1(x, y), (36)
with ε = y′ − y.
Now, considering a cross-risk vulnerable utility function, we have
U11(x, y)
U1(x, y)
≥
E [U11 (x, y + ε˜)]
E [U1 (x, y + ε˜)]
, (37)
for all x, y and all random variable ε˜ with zero mean.
Since U1 > 0, the equation above is equivalent to
U11(x, y) · E [U1(x, y + ε˜)]− E [U11(x, y + ε˜)] · U1(x, y) ≥ 0. (38)
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Thus, by definition of f , we obtain that U is cross-risk vulnerable toward an actuarially neutral back-
ground risk if and only if:
E [f (x, y, ε˜)] ≥ 0, (39)
for all x, y and all random variable ε˜ with zero mean.
Since, f(x, y, 0) = 0 for all x and y, lemma 1 allows us to assert that the previous relation holds if
and only if
f(x, y, ε) ≥ ∂εf(x, y, ε)|ε=0 · ε, ∀x, y and ε, (40)
which, by (35) concludes the proof. 
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